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ABSTRACT
Insider threats, as one type of the most challenging threats in cy-
berspace, usually cause significant loss to organizations. While the
problem of insider threat detection has been studied for a long time
in both security and data mining communities, the traditional ma-
chine learning based detection approaches, which heavily rely on
feature engineering, are hard to accurately capture the behavior
difference between insiders and normal users due to various chal-
lenges related to the characteristics of underlying data, such as
high-dimensionality, complexity, heterogeneity, sparsity, lack of la-
beled insider threats, and the subtle and adaptive nature of insider
threats. Advanced deep learning techniques provide a new para-
digm to learn end-to-end models from complex data. In this brief
survey, we first introduce one commonly-used dataset for insider
threat detection and review the recent literature about deep learn-
ing for such research. The existing studies show that compared
with traditional machine learning algorithms, deep learning mod-
els can improve the performance of insider threat detection. How-
ever, applying deep learning to further advance the insider threat
detection task still faces several limitations, such as lack of labeled
data, adaptive attacks. We then discuss such challenges and sug-
gest future research directions that have the potential to address
challenges and further boost the performance of deep learning for
insider threat detection.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Insider threats are malicious threats from people within the orga-
nization, which usually involve intentional fraud, the theft of con-
fidential or commercially valuable information, or the sabotage
of computer systems. The subtle and dynamic nature of insider
threats makes detection extremely difficult. The 2018 U.S. State
of Cybercrime Survey indicates that 25% of the cyberattacks are
committed by insiders, and 30% of respondents indicate incidents
caused by insider attacks are more costly or damaging than out-
sider attacks [19].
According to the latest technical report [18] from the CERT Co-
ordination Center (CERT/CC), a malicious insider is defined as “a
current or former employee, contractor, or business partner who
has or had authorized access to an organizationâĂŹs network, sys-
tem, or data, and has intentionally exceeded or intentionally used
that access in a manner that negatively affected the confidential-
ity, integrity, or availability of the organizationâĂŹs information
or information systems.”
Compared to the external attacks whose footprints are difficult
to hide, the attacks from insiders are hard to detect because the
malicious insiders already have the authorized power to access the
internal information systems. In general, there are three types of
insiders, i.e., traitors who misuse their privileges to commit mali-
cious activities, masqueraders who conduct illegal actions on be-
half of legitimate employees of an institute, and unintentional per-
petrators who unintentionally make mistakes [49]. Based on the
malicious activities conducted by the insiders, the insider threats
can also be categorized into three types, IT sabotage which directly
uses IT to make harm to an institute, theft of intellectual property
which steals information from the institute, fraud which indicates
unauthorized modification, addition, or deletion of data [34].
Insider threat detection has attracted significant attentions over
the last decade, where various insider threat detection approaches
have been proposed [23, 41, 60, 63, 64, 69]. Most of existing ap-
proaches achieve the insider threat detection by analyzing the users’
behaviors via the audit data, such as host-based data that record
activities of users on their own computers, network-based data
that are recorded by network equipments, and context data that
record users’ profile information. A recent survey [64] further cat-
egorizes the insider threat detection techniques into 9 classes based
on strategies and features used in detection: (1) anomaly based
approaches, (2) role based access control, (3) scenario based tech-
niques, (4) decoy documents and honeypot techniques, (5) risk anal-
ysis using psychological factors, (6) risk analysis using workflow,
(7) improving defense of the network, (8) improving defense by
access control, and (9) process control to dissuade insiders.
Although existing approaches demonstrate good performance
on insider threat detection, the traditional shallow machine learn-
ing models are unable to make full use of the user behavior data
due to their high-dimensionality, complexity, heterogeneity, and
sparsity. On the other hand, deep learning as a representation learn-
ing algorithm, which is able to learn multiple levels of hidden rep-
resentations from the complicated data based on its deep structure
[8, 42], can be used as a powerful tool to analyze the user behav-
ior in an organization to identify the potential malicious activities
from insiders.
Recently, by leveraging the deep feedforward neural network,
convolutional neural network (CNN), recurrent neural network
(RNN), and graph neural network (GNN), several approaches have
been proposed for insider threat detection [35, 37, 48, 51]. For exam-
ple, some RNN-based models are proposed to analyze the user se-
quential data to identify the malicious activities [51, 80, 82], while
a GNN-based model is investigated to detect the insiders based
on the user structural data in an organization [37]. However, us-
ing deep learning for insider threat detection still faces various
challenges related to the characteristics of insider threat detection
data, such as extremely small number of malicious activities and
adaptive attacks. Hence, developing advanced deep learning mod-
els that can improve the performance of insider threat detection is
still under-explored.
Currently, there is no existing review on the topic of deep learn-
ing for insider threat detection. We do not aim to provide a com-
prehensive survey on the domain of insider threat (see [34, 49]
for details) or a general review on deep learning (see [42]). In this
work, we focus on reviewing the current progresses and pointing
out potential future directions of deep learning for insider threat
detection. We first briefly review the deep learning and its applica-
tion on anomaly detection in Section 2. In Section 3 we introduce
one commonly-used dataset used in insider threat detection, ex-
plain why deep learning is needed for insider threat detection, and
review a few recent research works of deep learning based insider
threat detection. In Section 4, we identify and categorize challenges
into extremely unbalanced data, subtle attacks, temporal informa-
tion in attacks, heterogeneous data fusion, adaptive threats, fine-
grained detection, early detection, explainability, lack of testbed,
and lack of practical metrics. In Section 5, we point out research
opportunities of insider threat detection based on few-shot learn-
ing, self-supervised learning, deep marked temporal point process,
multi-modal learning, deep survival analysis, deep Bayesian non-
parametric learning, deep reinforcement learning, explainable deep
learning in addition to testbed development. Finally we conclude
this survey in Section 6.
2 DEEP LEARNING AND ITS APPLICATION
ON ANOMALY DETECTION
2.1 Deep Learning
With great achievement in various domains, such as computer vi-
sion [30], natural language process [50], and speech recognition
[20], deep learning has dominated the machine learning commu-
nity in the past few years [42]. Compared with traditional machine
learning models that heavily rely on hand engineering to identify
useful features to represent rawdata, deep learning models are able
to learn semantic representations from the raw data with minimal
human efforts. The deep learning models as representation learn-
ing models adopt a multi-layer structure to learn data representa-
tion, where the lower layers capture the low-level features of data,
while the higher layers extract the high-level abstract.
Deep learningmodels can be broadly categorized into four groups
based on their architectures: (1) deep feedforward neural network
(DFNN), which includes a number of deep learning models con-
sisting of multiple layers, such as deep belief network [32], deep
Boltzmann machine [62] and deep autoencoder [71]; (2) convolu-
tional neural network (CNN), which leverages the convolutional
and pooling layers to achieve the shift-invariant property; (3) re-
cursive neural network (RvNN), which takes a recursive data struc-
ture of variable sizes and makes predictions in a hierarchical struc-
ture; (4) recurrent neural network (RNN), which maintains an in-
ternal hidden state to capture the sequential information. Since the
deep learning field is growing so fast, many new types of deep
structures are proposed each year. The readers can refer to recent
surveys, e.g., [6, 12, 59, 83, 84], to learn more information about
deep learning and its applications in various domains.
2.2 Deep Learning for Anomaly Detection
Anomaly detection is to identify instances that are dissimilar to all
others, which is an important problem with multiple applications,
such as fraud detection, intrusion detection, and video surveillance
[13]. Anomalies are referred to as abnormalities, deviants, or out-
liers in the data mining and statistics literature and roughly speak-
ing insider threats can be treated as one type of anomalies. A va-
riety of machine learning and deep learning based anomaly detec-
tion approaches have been developed, however, they are not nec-
essarily applicable for insider threat detection due to the charac-
teristics of insider threat as will be shown in Section 3. A recent
survey [12] categorizes the deep learning-based anomaly detection
into three groups based on the availability of labels, i.e., super-
vised, semi-supervised, and unsupervised deep anomaly detection.
In some cases, when both normal and anomalous data are avail-
able, supervised deep anomaly detection approaches are proposed
for binary or multi-class classification [10, 11]. A more common
scenario is that it is easy to collect many normal samples while
only a small number of anomalous samples is available, so that
semi-supervised deep anomaly detection can be adopted by lever-
aging the normal samples to separate outliers [1, 67, 85]. When no
labeled data are available, unsupervised deep anomaly detection is
applied to detect anomalies based on intrinsic properties of data
samples[31, 68, 69].
Although many deep learning-based approaches for anomaly
detection have been proposed, the performance improvement of
deep learning for anomaly detection may not be as significant as
deep learning for other domains, such as computer vision and natu-
ral language process. The main potential reason is that deep learn-
ing models consisting of millions of parameters require a large
amount of labeled data for training properly. However, for anom-
aly detection, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to collect a large
number of labeled anomalies in the training data.
3 LITERATURE REVIEW
Insider threats as one of the most challenging attacks to address in
cyberspace have attracted much attention for a long time. Various
insider threat detection approaches, such as hidden Markov model
(HMM) and support vector machine (SVM), have been proposed in
literature [34, 64]. Moreover, leveraging the deep learning models
for insider threat detection is not well-explored in literature as only
a few papers are available. It is natural to question the need of deep
learningmodels for insider threat detection. In this section, we first
introduce a widely used insider threat dataset and describe its char-
acteristics.We then present why deep learning based insider threat
detection models are needed. At the end of this section, we review
the existing deep learning based insider threat detection papers in
literature and categorize them based on the adopted deep learning
architectures.
Table 1: Activity Types in Log Files
Files Operation Types
logon.csv
Weekday Logon (employee logs on a computer on a weekday at work hours)
Afterhour Weekday Logon (employee logs on a computer on a weekday after work hours)
Weekend Logon (employees logs on at weekends)
Logoff (employee logs off a computer)
email.csv
Send Internal Email (employee sends an internal email)
Send External Email (employee sends an external email)
View Internal Email (employee views an internal email)
View external Email (employee views an external email)
http.csv
WWW Visit (employee visits a website)
WWW Download (employee downloads files from a website)
WWW Upload (employee uploads files to a website)
device.csv
Weekday Device Connect (employee connects a device on a weekday at work hours)
Afterhour Weekday Device Connect (employee connects a device on a weekday after hours)
Weekend Device Connect (employee connects a device at weekends)
Disconnect Device (employee disconnects a device)
file.csv
Open doc/jpg/txt/zip File (employee opens a doc/jpg/txt/zip file)
Copy doc/jpg/txt/zip File (employee copies a doc/jpg/txt/zip file)
Write doc/jpg/txt/zip File (employee writes a doc/jpg/txt/zip file)
Delete doc/jpg/txt/zip File (employee deletes a doc/jpg/txt/zip file)
Table 2: The Statistics of CERT Datasets r4.2 and r6.2
# employees # insiders # activities
# malicious
activities
r4.2 1000 70 32,770,227 7323
r6.2 2500 5 135,117,169 470
3.1 CERT Insider Threat Dataset
The authors, in the recent survey [34], present case studies of in-
cidents of insider threat and existing datasets gathered from lab-
oratory experiments and the real world. They further group com-
monly used eleven datasets into five categories: masquerader-based,
traitor-based, miscellaneous malicious, substituted masqueraders,
and identification/authentication-based. We refer readers to this
survey [34] for detailed information on this topic. However, there
is no comprehensive real world dataset publicly available for in-
sider threat detection. Most of the recent studies adopt the syn-
thetic CMUCERT datasets [25] to evaluate their proposed approaches.
In this survey, we introduce the CERT dataset to illustrate chal-
lenges for insider threat detection.
The CERT division of Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie
MellonUniversity maintains a database ofmore than 1000 real case
studies of insider threat and has generated a collection of synthetic
insider threat datasets using scenarios containing traitor instances
and masquerade activities.
CERT dataset consists of five log files that record the computer-
based activities for all employees in a simulated organization, in-
cluding logon.csv that records the logon and logoff operations
of all employees, email.csv that records all the email operations
(send or receive), http.csv that records all the web browsing (visit,
download, or upload) operations, file.csv that records activities
(open, write, copy or delete) involving a removable media device,
and decive.csv that records the usage of a thumb drive (connect
or disconnect). Table 1 lists the activity types in each log file. For
each activity, it also contains related descriptions. For example, the
activity type “Send Internal Email” includes time, sender, receivers,
subject, and content information. Besides the employees’ activity
data on computers, the CERT dataset also provides the psychomet-
ric score for each employee, known as “Big Five personality traits”,
in psychometric.csv. The data generation process reflects prac-
tical constraints and employs a number of different model types,
e.g., graph models of the populationâĂŹs social structure, topic
models for generating content, psychometric models for dictating
behavior and preferences, models workplace behaviors.
There are several versions of datasets according to when the
datasets were created. The most widely-used versions are r4.2 and
r6.2. Table 2 shows the statistics of these two datasets. In short, r4.2
is a “dense” dataset that contains many insiders and malicious ac-
tivities, while r6.2 is a “sparse” dataset that contains 5 insiders and
3995 normal users. For each user, it records activities from January
2010 to June 2011. On average, the number of activities for each
employee is around 40000. Specifically, the CERT in r6.2 dataset
simulates the following five scenarios of attacks from insiders.
• User ACM2278who did not previously use removable drives
or work after hours begins logging in after hours, use a re-
movable drive, and upload data to wikileaks.org.
• User CMP2946 begins surfing jobwebsites and soliciting em-
ployment from a competitor. Before leaving the company,
they use a thumb drive to steal data.
• System administrator PLJ1771 becomes disgruntled. Down-
loads a keylogger and uses a thumb drive to transfer it to his
supervisor’s machine. The next day, he uses the collected
keylogs to log in as his supervisor and send out an alarming
mass email, causing panic in the organization. He leaves the
organization immediately.
Table 3: The numbers of activities, malicious activities, sessions, and malicious sessions for each insider
ACM2278 CDE1846 CMP2946 MBG3183 PLJ1771
Activity # 31370 37754 61989 42438 20964
Malicious activity # 22 134 242 4 18
Session # 316 374 627 679 770
Malicious session # 2 9 53 1 3
• User CDE1846 logs into another user’smachine and searches
for interesting files, emailing to their home email.
• User MBG3183, as a member of a group decimated by lay-
offs, uploads documents to Dropbox, planning to use them
for personal gain.
Table 3 shows the statistics of each of the above five insiders,
including the numbers of activity, malicious activity, session, and
malicious sessions. In sum, insider threat detection is a task like
looking for a needle in a haystack, thus it is generally infeasible to
manually define features or use shallow machine learning models
to detect insider threats.
3.2 Why Deep Learning for Insider Threat
Detection?
Among themany attractive properties of deep learning models, the
potential advantages of deep learning for insider threat detection
can be summarized as follows.
• RepresentationLearning. Themost significant advantage
of deep learning models is based on the capability to au-
tomatically discover the features needed for detection. The
user behavior in cyberspace is complicated and non-linear.
Manually designed features are hard and inefficient to cap-
ture user behavior information. Meanwhile, the learningmod-
els with shallow-structures, such as HMM and SVM, are rel-
atively simple structures with only one layer for transform-
ing the raw feature into a high-level abstract that can be
used for detection. These shallow models are effective for
solving many well-constrained problems, but shallow mod-
els with limited capability are hard to model complicated
user behavior data. Comparatively, deep learning models
are able to leverage deep non-linear modules to learn the
representation by using a general-purpose learning proce-
dure. Hence, it is a natural fit to use deep learning models
to capture complex user behavior and precisely detect user’s
intentions, especially those malicious ones.
• SequenceModeling. Deep learning models, such as recur-
rent neural network (RNN) and the newly-proposed Trans-
former, have shown promising performance in modeling se-
quential data, like video, text, and speech [27, 70]. Since it is
natural to represent the user activities recorded in audit data
as sequential data, leveraging RNN or Transformer to cap-
ture the salient information of complicated user behavior
has the great potential to boost the performance of insider
threat detection.
• Heterogeneous Data Composition. Deep learning mod-
els also have achieved great performance on tasks that fuse
heterogeneous data, such as image captioning [16, 36]. For
insider threat detection, besides modeling the user activity
data as sequences, other information, such as user profile
information and user structure information in an organiza-
tion, is also critical. Combining all the useful data for insider
threat detection is expected to achieve better performance
than only using a single type of data. Compared with tra-
ditional machine learning methods, deep learning models
are more powerful to combine the heterogeneous data for
detection.
3.3 Deep Learning For Insider Threat Detection
In this subsection, we review the main literature and categorize
deep learning based insider threat detection papers based on the
adopted deep learning architectures. Table 4 summarizes all the
papers discussed in this section.
As shown in Table 4, due to the extremely unbalanced nature of
the dataset, most of the proposed approaches adopt the unsuper-
vised learning paradigm for insider threat detection. For the detec-
tion granularity, most of the papers focus on detecting malicious
subsequence (e.g., activities in 24 hours) or malicious session. Here,
a session indicates a sequence of activities among “Logon” and “Lo-
goff”. If there are malicious activities in a session (subsequence),
the session (subsequence) will be labeled as a malicious session
(subsequence). Due to the limited information that can be lever-
aged, detecting malicious activities is difficult. Currently, there is
only one work focusing on activity level detection.
3.3.1 Deep Feedforward Neural Network. Deep feedforward neu-
ral network is a classical type of deep learning model. Various deep
learning models are feed-forward neural networks, such as deep
autoencoder, deep belief network, and deep Boltzmann machine
[59]. These deep neural networks are able to learn different lev-
els of representations from the input data based on the multi-layer
structures.
Several studies have proposed to use the deep feadforward neu-
ral network for insider threat detection. [48] uses deep autoen-
coder to detect the insider threat. Deep autoencoder consists of an
encoder and a decoder, where the encoder encodes the input data
to hidden representations while the decoder aims to reconstruct
the input data based on the hidden representations. The objective
of the deep autoencoder is to make the reconstructed input close
to the original input. Because the majority of activities in an or-
ganization are benign, the input with insider threats should have
relatively high reconstruction errors. As a result, the reconstruc-
tion error of the deep autoencoder can be used as an anomalous
score to identify the insider threat. Another idea of leveraging the
autoencoder structure is that after learning the hidden representa-
tions based on the reconstruction error, a one-class classifier, such
Table 4: Categorization of Deep Learning based Insider Threat Detection Papers Discussed in this Section
Model Paper Training
Granularity
Insider Session Activity
Deep Feed-forward
Neural Network
[48] Unsupervised
√
[45] One-class
√
Recurrent Neural Network
[51] Unsupervised
√
[69] Unsupervised
√
[82] Unsupervised
√
[80] Unsupervised
√
[79] Supervised
√
Convolutional Neural Network [35] Supervised
√
Graph Neural Network
[37] Supervised
√
[47] Unsupervised
√
as one-class SVM, is applied on the learned hidden representations
to identify the insider threats [45].
3.3.2 Recurrent Neural Network. Recurrent neural network (RNN)
is mainly used for modeling the sequential data, which maintains
a hidden state with a self-loop connection to encode the informa-
tion from a sequence [27]. The standard RNN is difficult to train
over long sequences due to the vanishing or exploding gradient
problem [9]. Currently, two variants of the standard RNN, Long
Short-Term Memory (LSTM) [33] and Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU)
[17], are widely-used to model the long sequences and capture the
long-time dependence by incorporating gate mechanisms.
The user activities on a computer can be naturallymodeled as se-
quential data. As a result, many RNN based approaches have been
proposed to model the user activities [51, 69, 79, 80] for insider
threat detection. The basic idea is to train an RNN model to pre-
dict a userâĂŹs next activity or period of activities. As long as the
prediction results and the user’s real activities do not have signifi-
cant differences, we consider the user follows the normal behavior.
Otherwise, user activities are suspicious. [69] proposes a stacked
LSTM structure to capture the user activities in a day and adopts
negative log-likelihoods of user activities as the anomalous scores
to identify malicious sessions. Rather than only using the activity
type, e.g., web visiting or file uploading, for insider threat detec-
tion, [80] proposes a hierarchical neural temporal point processes
model to capture both activity types and time information in a user
session and then derives an anomalous score based on the differ-
ences between the predicted results and real activities in terms of
types and time.
3.3.3 Convolutional Neural Network. Convolutional Neural Net-
work (CNN) has achieved great success in computer vision. A typ-
ical CNN structure consists of a convolutional layer followed by a
pooling layer and a fully connected layer for prediction. The con-
volutional and pooling layer ensures that the extracted features
from inputs are rotational and positional invariant, which is a very
useful property for image classification. The modern CNNs are ex-
tremely deep with tens of convolutional and pooling layers, which
can achieve promising performance for image classification [30,
40].
A recent study on insider threat detection proposes a CNN-based
user authenticationmethod by analyzingmouse bio-behavioral char-
acteristics [35]. The proposed approach represents the user mouse
behaviors on a computer as an image. If an ID theft attack occurs,
the user mouse behaviors will be inconsistent with the legal user.
Hence, a CNN model is applied on images generated based on the
mouse behavior to identify potential insider threats.
3.3.4 GraphNeural Network. Graph neural network (GNN), which
is able to model the relationships between nodes, has gained in-
creasing popularity for graph analysis [65, 77]. Awildly-used GNN
model is a graph convolutional network (GCN) that uses graph con-
volutional layer to extract node information. The graph convolu-
tional layer has similar properties of a typical convolutional layer,
such as local connections and shared weights, which are suitable
for graph analysis. For example, the nodes in graphs are usually lo-
cally connected so that the convolutional layer is able to aggregate
the feature information of a node from its neighbors. Besides GCN,
graph embedding, which aims at learning low-dimensional latent
representation of nodes in a network, has also attracted a lot of at-
tention. The learned node representations can be used as features
for various graph analysis tasks, such as classification, clustering,
link prediction, and visualization [15].
Recent work [37] adopts a GCN model to detect insiders. Since
users in an organization often make connections to each other
via email or operation on the same devices, it is natural to use
a graph structure to capture the inter-dependencies among users.
Besides taking the adjacency matrix of structural information as
input, GCN also incorporates the rich profile information about
the users as the feature vectors of nodes. After applying the con-
volutional layers for information propagation based on the graph
structure, GCN adopts the cross-entropy as the objective function
to predict malicious nodes (users) in a graph.
Inspired by graph embeddingmethods, research in [47] proposes
log2vec to detect malicious activities. Log2vec first constructs a
heterogeneous graph by representing various activities in audit
data as nodes and rich relationships among activities as edges and
then train node embeddings that can encode activity relationships.
Finally, by applying clustering algorithms on the node embeddings,
log2vec is able to separate malicious and benign activities into dif-
ferent clusters and identify malicious ones.
4 CHALLENGES
Although some progress has been achieved using deep learning
models for insider threat detection, there are many unsolved chal-
lenges from the perspectives of characteristics of underlying data,
insider threat, user expectations of detection algorithms, testbed
and evaluation metrics development. In the following, we high-
light the identified ten key challenges:
• Extremely Unbalanced Data. Compared with the benign
activities, themalicious activities from insiders are extremely
rare in real-world scenarios. Therefore, the insider threat
dataset is an unbalanced dataset, which is a big challenge to
train deep learning models. In general, deep learning mod-
els, which consist of tons of parameters, require large amounts
of labeled data to train properly. However, it is infeasible to
collect a large number of malicious insiders in reality. How
to leverage the existing small samples to properly train the
deep learning models is crucial to the insider threat detec-
tion task.
• Temporal Information in Attacks. Most of the existing
approaches for insider threat detection only focus on the ac-
tivity type information, such as copying files to a removable
disk or browsing a Web page. However, it is insufficient to
detect attacks simply based on activity types conducted by
users as the same activity could be either benign or mali-
cious. A simple case is that copying files in working hours
looks normal, but copying files at mid-night is suspicious.
The temporal information plays an important role in ana-
lyzing user behavior to identify those malicious threats, and
how to incorporate such temporal information is challeng-
ing.
• Heterogeneous Data Fusion. Besides the temporal infor-
mation, leveraging various data sources and fusing such het-
erogeneous data are also critical to improve the insider threat
detection. For example, a user who copes files in a daily rou-
tine foresees his potential layoff and has activities of copy-
ing credential files to the removable disk in purpose. In such
scenarios, considering the user profile (i.e., psychometric
score) or user interaction data could help to identify poten-
tial insider threats.
• Subtle Attacks. Currently, most of the existing work con-
sider the insider threat detection task as the anomaly de-
tection task, which usually models anomalous samples as
out-of-distribution samples. The existing models are usu-
ally trained on samples from benign users and then applied
to identify insiders that are dissimilar to observed benign
samples. A threshold or anomalous score is derived to quan-
tify the dissimilar between insiders and benign users. How-
ever, in reality, we cannot expect insiders have a signifi-
cant pattern change to conduct malicious activities. In or-
der to evade detection, insider threats are subtle and hard
to notice, which means that insiders and benign users are
close in the feature space. The traditional anomaly detection
approaches cannot detect insiders that are close to benign
users.
• Adaptive Threats. The insiders always improve attacking
strategies to evade detection. However, the learning-based
models are unable to detect new types of attacks after train-
ing. It is inefficient to train the models from scratch again
when new types of attacks are observed. First, it usually
needs some time to collect enough samples to train themodel.
More importantly, the re-training strategy cannot ensure in-
time detection and prevention. Designing a model that can
adaptively improve the performance of insider threat detec-
tion is an important and challenging task.
• Fine-grainedDetection. The existing deep learning based
approaches usually detect malicious sessions that contain
malicious activities. However, users usually conduct a large
number of activities in a session. Such coarse-grained de-
tection faces the problem that it is hard to achieve in time
detection. Hence, how to identify the fine-grained malicious
subsequence or the exact malicious activity is important for
insider threat detection. It is also a very challenging task.
This is because the information we can leverage from each
activity is very limited, i.e., we only observe when and what
activity is conducted by a user. Without enough informa-
tion, it is hard to achieve fine-grained insider threat detec-
tion.
• EarlyDetection.Current approaches focus on insider threat
detection, which means malicious activities already occur
and the significant loss is already caused to organizations.
Hence, an emerging topic is how to achieve the insider threat
early detection, i.e., detecting potential malicious activities
ahead of they actually happen. Several approaches are pro-
posed to defend the insider threat by using general IT se-
curity mechanisms [3, 66], but there is no learning-based
approach to achieve early detection. Proactively identifying
users who have high chances to conduct malicious activi-
ties in the near future is critical so that the organizations
can conduct the intervention ahead to prevent or reduce the
loss.
• Explainability. Deep learning models are usually consid-
ered as black boxes. Although deep learning can achieve
promising performance in many domains, the reason why
themodels work is still under-exploited.When an employee
is detected as an insider, it is critical to understand the rea-
son why the model makes such predictions since employ-
ees are usually the most valuable asset in an organization.
Especially, deep learning models cannot achieve 100% of ac-
curacy on insider threat detection. The false positive cases
(misclassifying benign users as insiders) can seriously affect
the loyalty of employees to the organization. Hence, the
model explainability is a key to provide the insight of the
model to domain-expert so that further actions can be con-
ducted with high confidence.
• Lack of Testbed. Currently, there is no real-world dataset
that is publicly-available for researchers. Although the CERT
datasets try to provide comprehensive information that are
close to the high level of human realism, there is still a gap
between the synthetic data and real-world scenario.
– Data Complexity. Since the CERT dataset is a synthetic
dataset,most of the activities are randomly generated with
limited complexity. For example, the websites that are ac-
cessed by employees are very limited. As a result, some
insider threats, such as visiting wikileak.org, can be eas-
ily identified. Meanwhile, the fine-grained user activities
are randomly generated, so there is no daily routine pat-
tern in this dataset. Furthermore, most of the activity time
in the dataset are randomly generated. As a result, it is
hard to leverage the temporal information to detect in-
sider threats based on this dataset.
– Insider Threat Complexity.The insider threat scenarios sim-
ulated in the dataset are also narrow compared with the
various insider threats conducted in the real-world. The
latest version of CERT dataset only consists of five scenar-
ios. Consequently, the proposed approaches, which can
achieve reasonable performance on this dataset, may not
be able to achieve good performance in practice. Mean-
while, even for the five insider threat scenarios, the diffi-
culty of identifying these insider threats are different. As
shown by the ROC curves in most of the existing papers
[45, 48, 51, 80], many studies can achieve 80% of the true
positive rate with a low false negative rate. However, the
false negative rate increases significantly when the true
positive rate keeps increasing. It means 80% of the insider
threats in this dataset can be well detected while the rest
of 20% insider threats are hard to detect.
• Lack of Practical Evaluation Metrics. The commonly-
used classification metrics, such as true positive rate (TPR),
false positive rate (FPR), precision, and recall, are adopted
to evaluate performance of insider threat detection. Based
on the TPR and FPR, an receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curve can be drawn by setting FPR and TPR as x
and y axes, respectively, which indicates the trade-off be-
tween true positive and false positive. Ideally, we expect an
insider threat detection algorithm can achieve TPR to be 1
and FPR to be 0. Currently, in literature, the ROC area un-
der curve (AUC) score is widely-used to compare the perfor-
mance of different detection algorithms [45, 47, 48, 51, 80].
Another metric is the precision-recall (PR) curve, which is
a plot of recall and precision as x and y axes and adopted in
evaluating the unbalanced data classification. Compared to
ROC-AUC, PR-AUC may be more useful to evaluate the al-
gorithms for insider threat detection because the PR curve
more focuses on the performance of classifiers on the mi-
nority class. However, due to the extremely small number
of insiders and the corresponding malicious activities, it is
unclear whether ROC-AUC or PR-AUC is practical to eval-
uate insider threat detection. For example, the ROC-AUC
values from different detection algorithms are often close
[48, 51, 80], which means that it is hard to identify a better
model based on ROC-AUC values.
5 FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The above challenges lead to several opportunities and future re-
search directions to improve the performance of deep learningmod-
els for insider threat detection. We point out the following topics,
which we believe would be promising for future research.
• Few-shot Learning based Insider ThreatDetection.Few-
shot learning aims at classifying samples from unknown
classes given only a few labeled samples [76]. Few-shot learn-
ing can further extend to a more rigorous setting, one-shot
learning [44] or zero-shot learning [74], where only one
or totally no labeled sample is available. Consider the ex-
tremely small number of insiders, few-shot learning is a
natural fit for insider threat detection. To tackle the chal-
lenge of a few labeled samples, few-shot learning leverage
the prior knowledge. Based on how to use the prior knowl-
edge, the existing few-shot learning algorithms can be cate-
gorized into three groups, the data based approaches which
augment training data by prior knowledge, the model based
approaches which use the prior knowledge to constrain hy-
pothesis space, and the algorithm based approaches which
alter search strategy in hypothesis space by prior knowl-
edge [76]. Based on the prior knowledge we have, different
few-shot learning algorithms can be developed for detecting
insider threats.
• Self-supervised Learning based Insider Threat Detec-
tion. Self-supervised learning aims at training a model us-
ing labels that can be easily derived from the input data
rather than requiring human efforts to label the data [5, 7,
75]. Self-supervised learning has achieved great success in
computer vision and natural language processing. A typical
self-supervised learning task in natural language processing
is to pretrain a deep learning model by a language model,
which is trained to predict the next word of a sentence. The
task we use to pretrain the deep learning model is called
“pretext task”. After pretraining, themodel can achieve great
performance on the “downstream tasks”, such as sentiment
analysis, by further fine-tuning on very little data. The suc-
cess of self-supervised learning is that via pretraining on the
pretext tasks, the deep learning model is able to learn the
salient information about the input data. In order to tackle
the challenge of detecting the subtle insider threat, a poten-
tial research direction is to design the proper self-supervised
tasks that can capture the difference between insiders and
benign users.
• Deep Marked Temporal Point Process based Insider
ThreatDetection.Marked temporal point process is a pow-
erfulmathematical tool tomodel the observed random event
patterns along time [21, 61]. Since temporal dynamics is an
important aspect of user behavior, marked temporal point
process is a suitable tool to analyze the user behavior in
terms of activity types and time. Recently, several deep learn-
ing based marked temporal point process models have been
proposed,which usually adopt the recurrent neural network
to characterize the conditional intensity function in tempo-
ral point process [21, 43, 78]. Hence, using deepmarked tem-
poral point process models has the potential to improve the
performance of insider threat detection by combining the
user activity types and time information.
• Multi-model Learning based Insider Threat Detection.
Because the same activity could be either benign or mali-
cious, besides the user activity data derived from the log
files, leveraging other sources is also important to improve
the performance of insider threat detection. In literature,
several studies investigated the performance of insider threat
detection via the users’ psychological data [2, 28, 29], while
some studies constructed user graph based on the organiza-
tion hierarchy or email communication to identify the out-
liers [24, 37, 54]. However, how to combine the user activity
data with the user profile data as well as the user relation-
ship data is under-exploited and worth to explore.
• Deep Survival Analysis based Insider Threat Early De-
tection. Survival analysis is to model the data where the
outcome is the time until the occurrence of an event of in-
terest [73]. Survival analysis is originally used in health data
analysis [46, 52] and has been applied to many applications,
such as predicting student dropout time [4] or web user re-
turn time [38]. If we consider the time when an insider con-
ducts a malicious activity as the event of interest, we can
use the survival analysis to predict when the event (conduct-
ing a malicious activity) occurs. As a result, organizations
can have early alerts about potential attacks from insiders.
Recently, deep learning models are adopted to model the
complex survival distributions [14, 39, 52]. Hence, leverag-
ing deep survival analysis models has a great potential to
capture the user activity time information and thus achieve
insider threat early detection.
• DeepBayesianNonparametricModel for Fine-grained
Insider Threat Detection. In order to achieve the fine-
grained insider threat detection, one potential solution is
to consider activities from one user in audit data as an activ-
ity stream and apply a clustering algorithm on the stream to
identify the potentialmalicious clusters of activities. Bayesian
nonparametric models, such as Dirichlet processes, are of-
ten used for data clustering and able to generate unbounded
clusters [58]. The infinite nature of these models is suitable
tomodel complicated user behavior. Recently, several Bayesian
nonparametric deep generative models, which are proposed
to combine the deep structurewith Bayesian nonparametric
[26, 55, 81], are effective to learn rich representation based
on neural networks with Bayesian methods. Leveraging the
deep Bayesian nonparametric models has the potential to
achieve fine-grained insider threat detection.
• DeepReinforcement Learning based InsiderThreatDe-
tection. Deep reinforcement learning is able to learn op-
timal policies for sophisticated agents in a complex envi-
ronment [6]. The advantage of deep reinforcement learn-
ing is that the policy consistently enhances its performance
through reward signals. In the insider threat detection task,
the insider detector can be considered as an agent in the
deep reinforcement learning framework. With a properly
designed reward function, the insider detector is able to keep
improving the capability to identify insider attacks includ-
ing the adaptive attacks. One challenge of applying the deep
reinforcement learning for insider threat detection is that
due to the complicated of malicious attacks, sometimes it is
hard to design a good reward function. In such scenario, in-
verse reinforcement learning framework, whose goal is to
identify a reward function automatically based on the be-
havior of insiders, can be further considered [56, 57]. An-
other challenge is that deep reinforcement learning usually
requires large amounts of training data that are unavailable
in the insider detection task. To tackle this challenge, other
machine learning paradigms, such as meta-learning or im-
itation learning can be further combined with the deep re-
inforcement learning in practice [22, 72]. Overall, although
facing several challenges, deep reinforcement learning as a
powerful framework has the opportunity to make a break-
through in insider threat detection.
• Explainable Deep Learning for Insider Threat Detec-
tion. Unlike some online anomaly detection tasks, such as
bot detection on social media, which do not have an im-
pact on real human beings, the insider threat detection is to
identify malicious individuals, which is a high-stakes deci-
sion. Consequently, it is critical for insider threat detection
models to have proper explainability even the models can
achieve superior performance. Hence, how to make predic-
tion results understandable to human is key toward a trust-
worthy and reliable insider threat detection model. Another
advantage of developing explainable deep learning models
is that suchmodels have the potential to achieve fine-grained
malicious activity detection. For example, if we consider the
user activity sequence in a day as a data point and each ac-
tivity in the sequence as a feature, the counterfactual ex-
planation model [53], which finds a similar data point by
changing some of the features for which the predicted out-
come changes in a relevant way, has the potential capabil-
ity to identify malicious activities from an insider activity
sequence.
• TestbedDevelopment.To achieve insider threat detection,
human actions within the monitored environment should
be used as the analytical data. However, due to the privacy
and confidentiality issues, the publicly available datasets in
literature are very limited. Most of the recent work [25, 45,
48, 69] adopt the CERT dataset. However, as a synthetic
dataset, the user activities in CERT dataset are not compli-
cated enough. Consequently, developing a comprehensive
testbed for insider threat detection evaluation is greatly needed.
• Practical EvaluationMetrics. Due to the extremely small
number of insiders and the corresponding malicious activi-
ties, the commonly-used classificationmetrics, such as accu-
racy, F1, ROC-AUC, and PR-AUC are not sufficient for eval-
uating the performance of insider threat detection. It is an
open questionwhichmetrics aremore practical andwhether
some new metrics need to be developed. A recent study pro-
poses a recall based metric, called cumulative recall (CR-k),
to evaluate the performance of algorithms on insider threat
detection [69]. Cumulative recall assumes that there is a
daily budget k to exam the top-k samples with the highest
malicious scores derived from the algorithms. Then, the CR-
k is defined as the sum of the recalls for all budgets up to k .
For example, if we define R(i) to be the recall with a budget
of i , CR-k is calculated as R(25) + R(50) + · · · + R(k). CR-
k can be considered as an approximation to an area under
the recall curve. Because for insider threat detection tasks,
the cost of a missed detection is substantially higher than
the cost of a false positive, a recall based metric may be a
suitable metric.
6 CONCLUSION
In this brief survey paper, we have reviewed various approaches in
deep learning-based insider threat detection and categorized the
existing approaches based on the adopted deep learning architec-
tures. Although some progress has been achieved, the topic of us-
ing deep learning for insider threat detection is not well-exploited
due to various challenges. We have discussed the challenges in this
task and proposed several research directions that have the po-
tential to advance insider threat detection based on deep learning
techniques. Overall, deep learning for insider threat detection is an
under-explored research topic. This survey could be extended and
updated in the future as more advanced approaches are proposed.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported in part by NSF grant 1564250.
REFERENCES
[1] Samet Akcay, Amir Atapour-Abarghouei, and Toby P. Breckon. 2018.
GANomaly: Semi-Supervised Anomaly Detection via Adversarial Training.
arXiv:1805.06725 [cs] (May 2018). arXiv:1805.06725 [cs]
[2] Abdulaziz Almehmadi and Khalil El-Khatib. 2014. On the Possibility of In-
sider Threat Detection Using Physiological Signal Monitoring. In Proceedings
of the 7th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks (SIN
’14). Association for Computing Machinery, Glasgow, Scotland, UK, 223–230.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2659651.2659654
[3] Sultan Alneyadi, Elankayer Sithirasenan, and Vallipuram Muthukkumarasamy.
2016. A Survey on Data Leakage Prevention Systems. Journal of Network and
Computer Applications 62, C (Feb. 2016), 137–152.
[4] Sattar Ameri, Mahtab J Fard, Ratna B Chinnam, and Chandan K Reddy. 2016.
Survival Analysis Based Framework for Early Prediction of Student Dropouts.
In CIKM. 903–912.
[5] Relja Arandjelovic and Andrew Zisserman. 2017. Look, Listen and Learn. In
Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision. 609–617.
[6] Kai Arulkumaran, Marc Peter Deisenroth, Miles Brundage, and Anil An-
thony Bharath. 2017. Deep Reinforcement Learning: A Brief Sur-
vey. IEEE Signal Processing Magazine 34, 6 (Nov. 2017), 26–38.
https://doi.org/10.1109/MSP.2017.2743240
[7] Yuki M. Asano, Christian Rupprecht, and Andrea Vedaldi. 2019. A Critical Anal-
ysis of Self-Supervision, or What We Can Learn from a Single Image. In ICLR.
[8] Yoshua Bengio. 2013. Deep Learning of Representations: Looking Forward. In
Statistical Language and Speech Processing, Adrian-Horia Dediu, Carlos Martín-
Vide, Ruslan Mitkov, and Bianca Truthe (Eds.). Number 7978 in Lecture Notes in
Computer Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1–37.
[9] Y. Bengio, P. Simard, and P. Frasconi. 1994. Learning Long-Term Dependencies
with Gradient Descent Is Difficult. Neural Networks, IEEE Transactions on 5, 2
(1994), 157–166. https://doi.org/10.1109/72.279181
[10] Raghavendra Chalapathy, Ehsan Zare Borzeshi, and Massimo Piccardi. 2016.
Bidirectional LSTM-CRF for Clinical Concept Extraction. arXiv:1610.05858 [cs]
(Oct. 2016). arXiv:1610.05858 [cs]
[11] Raghavendra Chalapathy, Ehsan Zare Borzeshi, and Massimo Piccardi. 2016. An
Investigation of Recurrent Neural Architectures for Drug Name Recognition.
arXiv:1609.07585 [cs] (Sept. 2016). arXiv:1609.07585 [cs]
[12] Raghavendra Chalapathy and Sanjay Chawla. 2019. Deep Learning for Anomaly
Detection: A Survey. arXiv:1901.03407 [cs, stat] (Jan. 2019). arXiv:1901.03407 [cs,
stat]
[13] Varun Chandola, Arindam Banerjee, and Vipin Kumar. 2009. Anomaly Detec-
tion: A Survey. Association for Computing Machinery 41, 3 (July 2009).
[14] Paidamoyo Chapfuwa, Chenyang Tao, Chunyuan Li, Courtney Page, Benjamin
Goldstein, Lawrence Carin, and Ricardo Henao. 2018. Adversarial Time-to-
Event Modeling. In ICML. arXiv:1804.03184
[15] Haochen Chen, Bryan Perozzi, Rami Al-Rfou, and Steven Skiena. 2018. A Tuto-
rial on Network Embeddings. CoRR abs/1808.02590 (2018). arXiv:1808.02590
[16] Yong Cheng, Fei Huang, Lian Zhou, Cheng Jin, Yuejie Zhang, and Tao Zhang.
2017. A Hierarchical Multimodal Attention-Based Neural Network for Image
Captioning. In Proceedings of the 40th International ACM SIGIR Conference on
Research and Development in Information Retrieval (SIGIR ’17). ACM, New York,
NY, USA, 889–892. https://doi.org/10.1145/3077136.3080671
[17] Junyoung Chung, Caglar Gulcehre, Kyunghyun Cho, and Yoshua Bengio. 2015.
Gated Feedback Recurrent Neural Networks. In ICML. arXiv:1502.02367
[18] Daniel Costa, Michael Albrethsen, Matthew Collins, Samuel Perl, George
Silowash, and Derrick Spooner. 2016. An Insider Threat Indicator Ontology. Tech-
nical Report CMU/SEI-2016-TR-007. Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie
Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA.
[19] CSO, CERT Division of SRI-CMU, and ForcePoint. 2018. 2018 U.S. State of Cy-
bercrime. Technical Report.
[20] Li Deng, Geoffrey Hinton, and Brian Kingsbury. 2013. New Types of Deep
Neural Network Learning for Speech Recognition and Related Applications: An
Overview. In IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Pro-
cessing.
[21] Nan Du, Hanjun Dai, Rakshit Trivedi, Utkarsh Upadhyay, Manuel Gomez-
Rodriguez, and Le Song. 2016. Recurrent Marked Temporal Point Processes:
Embedding Event History to Vector. In Proceedings of the 22Nd ACM SIGKDD In-
ternational Conference on Knowledge Discovery and DataMining (KDD ’16). ACM,
New York, NY, USA, 1555–1564. https://doi.org/10.1145/2939672.2939875
[22] Yan Duan, Marcin Andrychowicz, Bradly Stadie, OpenAI Jonathan Ho, Jonas
Schneider, Ilya Sutskever, Pieter Abbeel, and Wojciech Zaremba. 2017. One-
Shot Imitation Learning. In NIPS, I. Guyon, U. V. Luxburg, S. Bengio, H. Wal-
lach, R. Fergus, S. Vishwanathan, and R. Garnett (Eds.). Curran Associates, Inc.,
1087–1098.
[23] H. Eldardiry, E. Bart, J. Liu, J. Hanley, B. Price, and O. Brdiczka. 2013. Multi-
Domain Information Fusion for Insider Threat Detection. In 2013 IEEE Security
and Privacy Workshops. 45–51. https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2013.14
[24] Anagi Gamachchi, Li Sun, and Serdar Boztas. 2018. A Graph Based Frame-
work for Malicious Insider Threat Detection. arXiv:1809.00141 [cs] (Sept. 2018).
arXiv:1809.00141 [cs]
[25] J. Glasser and B. Lindauer. 2013. Bridging the Gap: A Pragmatic Approach to
Generating Insider Threat Data. In 2013 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops.
98–104. https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2013.37
[26] Prasoon Goyal, Zhiting Hu, Xiaodan Liang, Chenyu Wang, and Eric Xing.
2017. Nonparametric Variational Auto-Encoders for Hierarchical Representa-
tion Learning. In ICCV. arXiv:1703.07027
[27] Alex Graves. 2013. Generating Sequences With Recurrent Neural Networks.
arXiv:1308.0850 [cs] (Aug. 2013). arXiv:1308.0850 [cs]
[28] Frank L. Greitzer,Lars J. Kangas, Christine F. Noonan, Christopher R. Brown, and
Thomas Ferryman. 2013. Psychosocial Modeling of Insider Threat Risk Based
on Behavioral and Word Use Analysis. e-Service Journal 9, 1 (2013), 106–138.
https://doi.org/10.2979/eservicej.9.1.106
[29] Yassir Hashem, Hassan Takabi, Mohammad GhasemiGol, and Ram Dantu. 2015.
Towards Insider ThreatDetection Using Psychophysiological Signals. In Proceed-
ings of the 7th ACM CCS International Workshop on Managing Insider Security
Threats (MIST ’15). Association for Computing Machinery, Denver, Colorado,
USA, 71–74. https://doi.org/10.1145/2808783.2808792
[30] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian Sun. 2016. Deep Residual
Learning for Image Recognition. In CVPR. 770–778. arXiv:1512.03385
[31] Dan Hendrycks, Mantas Mazeika, and Thomas G. Dietterich. 2018. Deep Anom-
aly Detection with Outlier Exposure. arXiv:1812.04606 [cs, stat] (Dec. 2018).
arXiv:1812.04606 [cs, stat]
[32] Geoffrey E. Hinton, Simon Osindero, and Yee-Whye Teh. 2006. A Fast Learning
Algorithm for Deep Belief Nets. Neural Computation 18, 7 (May 2006), 1527–1554.
https://doi.org/10.1162/neco.2006.18.7.1527
[33] Sepp Hochreiter and Jurgen Schmidhuber. 1997. Long Short-TermMemory. Neu-
ral computation 9, 8 (1997), 1735–1780.
[34] Ivan Homoliak, Flavio Toffalini, Juan Guarnizo, Yuval Elovici, andMartín Ochoa.
2019. Insight Into Insiders and IT: A Survey of Insider Threat Taxonomies, Anal-
ysis, Modeling, and Countermeasures. 52, 2 (April 2019), 40.
[35] Teng Hu, Weina Niu, Xiaosong Zhang, Xiaolei Liu, Jiazhong Lu, and Yuan Liu.
2019. An Insider Threat Detection Approach Based on Mouse Dynamics and
Deep Learning. Security and Communication Networks 2019 (Feb. 2019), 3898951.
https://doi.org/10.1155/2019/3898951
[36] Chao Huang, Chuxu Zhang, Jiashu Zhao, Xian Wu, Dawei Yin, and Nitesh
Chawla. 2019. MiST: A Multiview and Multimodal Spatial-Temporal Learn-
ing Framework for Citywide Abnormal Event Forecasting. In The World
Wide Web Conference (WWW ’19). ACM, San Francisco, CA, USA, 717–728.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3308558.3313730
[37] Jianguo Jiang, Jiuming Chen, Tianbo Gu, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Chao Liu,
Min Yu,Weiqing Huang, and PrasantMohapatra. 2019. Anomaly Detection with
Graph Convolutional Networks for Insider Threat and Fraud Detection. In MIL-
COM 2019 - 2019 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM). 109–114.
https://doi.org/10.1109/MILCOM47813.2019.9020760
[38] How Jing and Alexander J. Smola. 2017. Neural Survival Recommender. InCIKM.
515–524. https://doi.org/10.1145/3018661.3018719
[39] Jared L. Katzman, Uri Shaham, Alexander Cloninger, Jonathan Bates, Tingting
Jiang, and Yuval Kluger. 2018. DeepSurv: Personalized Treatment Recommender
System Using a Cox Proportional Hazards Deep Neural Network. BMC Medical
Research Methodology 18, 1 (Feb. 2018), 24.
[40] Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey E. Hinton. 2012. ImageNet Clas-
sification with Deep Convolutional Neural Networks. In NIPS, F. Pereira, C. J. C.
Burges, L. Bottou, and K. Q. Weinberger (Eds.).
[41] D. C. Le and A. N. Zincir-Heywood. 2018. Evaluating Insider Threat Detection
Workflow Using Supervised and Unsupervised Learning. In 2018 IEEE Security
and Privacy Workshops (SPW). 270–275.
[42] Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio, and Geoffrey Hinton. 2015. Deep Learning. Nature
521, 7553 (May 2015), 436–444.
[43] Shuang Li, Shuai Xiao, Shixiang Zhu, NanDu, Yao Xie, and Le Song. 2018. Learn-
ing Temporal Point Processes via Reinforcement Learning. In NIPS, S. Bengio,
H. Wallach, H. Larochelle, K. Grauman, N. Cesa-Bianchi, and R. Garnett (Eds.).
Curran Associates, Inc., 10804–10814.
[44] Li Fei-Fei, R. Fergus, and P. Perona. 2006. One-Shot Learning of Object Cat-
egories. IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence 28, 4
(April 2006), 594–611. https://doi.org/10.1109/TPAMI.2006.79
[45] Lingli Lin, Shangping Zhong, Cunmin Jia, and Kaizhi Chen. 2017. In-
sider Threat Detection Based on Deep Belief Network Feature Represen-
tation. In 2017 International Conference on Green Informatics (ICGI). 54–59.
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICGI.2017.37
[46] Bin Liu, Ying Li, Zhaonan Sun, Soumya Ghosh, and Kenney Ng. 2018. Early
Prediction of Diabetes Complications from Electronic Health Records: A Multi-
Task Survival Analysis Approach. In AAAI.
[47] Fucheng Liu, Yu Wen, Dongxue Zhang, Xihe Jiang, Xinyu Xing, and Dan Meng.
2019. Log2vec: A Heterogeneous Graph Embedding Based Approach for Detect-
ing Cyber Threats within Enterprise. In Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (London, United King-
dom) (CCS âĂŹ19). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA,
1777âĂŞ1794.
[48] Liu Liu, Olivier De Vel, Chao Chen, Jun Zhang, and Yang Xiang. 2018.
Anomaly-Based Insider Threat Detection Using Deep Autoencoders. In 2018
IEEE International Conference on Data Mining Workshops (ICDMW). 39–48.
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDMW.2018.00014
[49] L. Liu, O. De Vel, Q. Han, J. Zhang, and Y. Xiang. Secondquarter 2018. Detecting
and Preventing Cyber Insider Threats: A Survey. IEEE Communications Surveys
Tutorials 20, 2 (Secondquarter 2018), 1397–1417.
[50] Qi Liu, Matt J. Kusner, and Phil Blunsom. 2020. A Survey on Contextual Embed-
dings. arXiv:2003.07278 [cs] (April 2020). arXiv:2003.07278 [cs]
[51] Jiuming Lu and Raymond K. Wong. 2019. Insider Threat Detection with Long
Short-Term Memory. In Proceedings of the Australasian Computer Science Week
Multiconference (ACSW 2019). Association for Computing Machinery, Sydney,
NSW, Australia, 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1145/3290688.3290692
[52] Margaux Luck, Tristan Sylvain, Héloïse Cardinal, Andrea Lodi, and Yoshua Ben-
gio. 2017. Deep Learning for Patient-Specific Kidney Graft Survival Analysis.
arXiv:1705.10245 [cs, stat] (May 2017). arXiv:1705.10245 [cs, stat]
[53] Christoph Molnar. 2019. Interpretable Machine Learning.
[54] Pablo Moriano, Jared Pendleton, Steven Rich, and L Jean Camp. 2017. Insider
Threat Event Detection in User-System Interactions. In Proceedings of the 2017
International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats (MIST ’17). Associ-
ation for Computing Machinery, Dallas, Texas, USA, 1–12.
[55] Eric Nalisnick and Padhraic Smyth. 2017. Stick-Breaking Variational Autoen-
coders. In ICLR. arXiv:1605.06197
[56] Andrew Y. Ng and Stuart J. Russell. 2000. Algorithms for Inverse Reinforcement
Learning. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Conference on Machine
Learning (ICML ’00). Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., San Francisco, CA, USA,
663–670.
[57] Min-hwan Oh and Garud Iyengar. 2019. Sequential Anomaly Detection Using
Inverse Reinforcement Learning. In Proceedings of the 25thACM SIGKDD Interna-
tional Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining (KDD ’19). Association
for Computing Machinery, Anchorage, AK, USA, 1480–1490.
[58] John Paisley, Lawrence Carin, and Rebecca Willett Lu. 2010. Machine Learning
with Dirichlet and Beta Process Priors : Theory and Applications. Ph.D. Disserta-
tion. Duke University.
[59] Samira Pouyanfar, Saad Sadiq, Yilin Yan, Haiman Tian, Yudong Tao, Maria Presa
Reyes, Mei-Ling Shyu, Shu-Ching Chen, and S. S. Iyengar. 2018. A Survey on
Deep Learning: Algorithms, Techniques, and Applications.
[60] Tabish Rashid, Ioannis Agrafiotis, and Jason R.C. Nurse. 2016. A New Take on
Detecting Insider Threats: Exploring the Use of Hidden Markov Models. In Pro-
ceedings of the 8th ACMCCS International Workshop onManaging Insider Security
Threats (MIST ’16). ACM, Vienna, Austria, 47–56.
[61] Jakob Gulddahl Rasmussen. 2018. Lecture Notes: Temporal Point Processes
and the Conditional Intensity Function. arXiv:1806.00221 [stat] (June 2018).
arXiv:1806.00221 [stat]
[62] Ruslan Salakhutdinov and Geoffrey Hinton. 2009. Deep Boltzmann Machines.
Proceedings of the international conference on artificial intelligence and statistics
5, 2 (2009), 448–456.
[63] Malek Ben Salem, Shlomo Hershkop, and Salvatore J. Stolfo. 2008. A Survey of
Insider Attack Detection Research. In Insider Attack and Cyber Security: Beyond
the Hacker, Salvatore J. Stolfo, StevenM. Bellovin, Angelos D. Keromytis, Shlomo
Hershkop, SeanW. Smith, and Sara Sinclair (Eds.). Springer US, Boston, MA, 69–
90.
[64] Ameya Sanzgiri and Dipankar Dasgupta. 2016. Classification of Insider Threat
Detection Techniques. In Proceedings of the 11th Annual Cyber and Information
Security Research Conference (CISRC ’16). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 25:1–25:4.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2897795.2897799
[65] Franco Scarselli, Marco Gori, Ah Chung Tsoi, Markus Hagenbuch-
ner, and Gabriele Monfardini. 2009. The Graph Neural Network
Model. IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks 20, 1 (Jan. 2009), 61–80.
https://doi.org/10.1109/TNN.2008.2005605
[66] Asaf Shabtai, Yuval Elovici, and Lior Rokach. 2012. A Survey of Data Leakage
Detection and Prevention Solutions. Springer Science & Business Media.
[67] Hongchao Song, Zhuqing Jiang, Aidong Men, and Bo Yang. 2017. A Hybrid
Semi-Supervised Anomaly Detection Model for High-Dimensional Data. Com-
putational Intelligence and Neuroscience 2017 (Nov. 2017), 8501683.
[68] Ya Su, Youjian Zhao, Chenhao Niu, Rong Liu,Wei Sun, and Dan Pei. 2019. Robust
Anomaly Detection for Multivariate Time Series through Stochastic Recurrent
Neural Network. In Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGKDD International Confer-
ence on Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining (KDD ’19). Association for Comput-
ing Machinery, Anchorage, AK, USA, 2828–2837.
[69] Aaron Tuor, Samuel Kaplan, Brian Hutchinson, Nicole Nichols, and Sean Robin-
son. 2017. Deep Learning for Unsupervised Insider Threat Detection in Struc-
tured Cybersecurity Data Streams. In AI for Cyber Security Workshop at AAAI
2017. arXiv:1710.00811
[70] Ashish Vaswani, Noam Shazeer, Niki Parmar, Jakob Uszkoreit, Llion Jones,
Aidan N. Gomez, Lukasz Kaiser, and Illia Polosukhin. 2017. Attention Is All
You Need. In NIPS. arXiv:1706.03762
[71] Pascal Vincent, Hugo Larochelle, Yoshua Bengio, and Pierre-Antoine Man-
zagol. 2008. Extracting and Composing Robust Features with Denoising Au-
toencoders. In Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on Machine
Learning - ICML ’08. ACM Press, New York, New York, USA, 1096–1103.
https://doi.org/10.1145/1390156.1390294
[72] Jane X. Wang, Zeb Kurth-Nelson, Dhruva Tirumala, Hubert Soyer, Joel Z.
Leibo, Remi Munos, Charles Blundell, Dharshan Kumaran, and Matt Botvinick.
2017. Learning to Reinforcement Learn. arXiv:1611.05763 [cs, stat] (Jan. 2017).
arXiv:1611.05763 [cs, stat]
[73] Ping Wang, Yan Li, and Chandan K. Reddy. 2017. Machine Learning for Survival
Analysis: A Survey. (Aug. 2017).
[74] Wei Wang, Vincent W. Zheng, Han Yu, and Chunyan Miao. 2019. A Survey
of Zero-Shot Learning: Settings, Methods, and Applications. ACM Trans. Intell.
Syst. Technol. 10, 2 (Jan. 2019), 13:1–13:37. https://doi.org/10.1145/3293318
[75] XiaolongWang,Allan Jabri, andAlexei A. Efros. 2019. LearningCorrespondence
from the Cycle-Consistency of Time. In CVPR. arXiv:1903.07593
[76] YaqingWang, Quanming Yao, James Kwok, and Lionel M. Ni. 2020. Generalizing
from a Few Examples: A Survey on Few-Shot Learning. arXiv:1904.05046 [cs]
(March 2020). arXiv:1904.05046 [cs]
[77] Zonghan Wu, Shirui Pan, Fengwen Chen, Guodong Long, Chengqi Zhang, and
Philip S. Yu. 2019. A Comprehensive Survey on Graph Neural Networks.
arXiv:1901.00596 [cs, stat] (Jan. 2019). arXiv:1901.00596 [cs, stat]
[78] Shuai Xiao, Hongteng Xu, Junchi Yan, Mehrdad Farajtabar, Xiaokang Yang, Le
Song, and Hongyuan Zha. 2018. Learning Conditional Generative Models for
Temporal Point Processes. In Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intel-
ligence.
[79] Fangfang Yuan, Yanan Cao, Yanmin Shang, Yanbing Liu, Jianlong Tan, and Binx-
ing Fang. 2018. Insider Threat Detection with Deep Neural Network. In Com-
putational Science – ICCS 2018 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science), Yong Shi,
Haohuan Fu, Yingjie Tian, Valeria V. Krzhizhanovskaya, Michael Harold Lees,
Jack Dongarra, and Peter M. A. Sloot (Eds.). Springer International Publishing,
Cham, 43–54.
[80] Shuhan Yuan, Panpan Zheng, Xintao Wu, and Qinghua Li. 2019. Insider Threat
Detection via Hierarchical Neural Temporal Point Processes. In 2019 IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Big Data (Big Data). 1343–1350.
[81] Aonan Zhang and John Paisley. 2018. Deep Bayesian Nonparametric Tracking.
In International Conference on Machine Learning. 5833–5841.
[82] Dongxue Zhang, Yang Zheng, Yu Wen, Yujue Xu, Jingchuo Wang, Yang
Yu, and Dan Meng. 2018. Role-Based Log Analysis Applying Deep
Learning for Insider Threat Detection. In Proceedings of the 1st Workshop
on Security-Oriented Designs of Computer Architectures and Processors (Se-
cArch’18). Association for Computing Machinery, Toronto, Canada, 18–20.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3267494.3267495
[83] Lei Zhang, Shuai Wang, and Bing Liu. 2018. Deep Learning for Sentiment Anal-
ysis : A Survey. arXiv:1801.07883 [cs, stat] (Jan. 2018). arXiv:1801.07883 [cs, stat]
[84] Ziwei Zhang, Peng Cui, and Wenwu Zhu. 2018. Deep Learning on Graphs: A
Survey. arXiv:1812.04202 [cs, stat] (Dec. 2018). arXiv:1812.04202 [cs, stat]
[85] Panpan Zheng, ShuhanYuan, XintaoWu, Jun Li, andAidong Lu. 2019. One-Class
Adversarial Nets for Fraud Detection. In The Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019. 1286–1293.
